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Abstract 
This article analyzes the United States toward “axis of evil” 
countries, namely Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Since 
September 11, 2001, according to George Walker Bush, 
these countries are sponsor of terror that threat America or 
friend’s and allies’ of America with weapons of mass 
destruction. 
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Background of the Study 
Five of the most important issues raised by current events or by various 
critics of established approaches: international terrorism, the environment, 
gender, sovereignty and the changes in statehood involving new security 
challenges (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 249). Then, the important actors in IR 
(International Relations) are states (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2008: 12). The 
international system is the set of relationships among the world’s states, 
structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. The action of a 
state in the international arena result from individual human choices by its 
citizenry, its political leaders, its diplomats and bureaucrats aggregated through 
the state’s internal structures. The study of foreign policy concentrates on forces 
within the state, its main emphasis is on the individual and domestic levels of 
analysis. The domestic level of analysis concerns the aggregations of individuals 
within states that influence state actions in the International arena. 
 National governments maybe the most important actors in IR, but they 
are strongly influenced by a variety of non-state actors. The terrorist attack on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, and the reshaping of the strategic 
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landscape in the twenty-first century created complex challenges and dilemmas 
for the United States.  The challenge came not only from within the established 
international order, but also from international terrorist (non-state actors).  
Actually, as the twenty-first century began, the United States was the 
world’s sole superpower, with the world’s largest economy, most powerful 
military, and most influential social and cultural outlooks (O’Connor and Sabato, 
2004:784). Even so, it faced significant foreign and military policy challenges. 
The September 11, 2001, attacks magnified two challenges above all others, 
homeland defense and fighting a global war on terrorism. These two challenges 
required additional security measures at home, military action overseas, more 
cooperative intelligence with allies, coalition diplomacy with virtually everyone, 
and eliminating terrorist access to financial institutions. 
 President George Walker Bush through the promulgation of a broader 
approach to the issue of the state sponsorship of terrorism in his January 2002  
State of the Union Address. In the wake of the liquidation of the Al-Qaida-
sponsoring Taliban regime in Afghanistan through the successful completion of 
Operation Enduring Freedom the previous month, Bush used the address to 
impress upon those states with a history of support for terrorism that the United 
States would not tolerate such behavior. In particular, the president 
characterized three states (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) as members of “an axis of 
evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Pauly, JR, and Lansford, 2005: 
8). Furthermore, he referred explicitly to the threats posed by states determined 
to develop WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and maintain relationship with 
terrorists, including, but not limited to, bin Laden and his global network, 
concluding that Iraq, Iran and North Korea “pose a grave and growing danger. 
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match 
their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic” 
(Pauly, JR, 2005: 6). Essentially, that address provided the rhetorical foundation 
for the planning and prosecution of the Second Iraq War. 
 The common principle of the “axis of evil” was that all three regimes were 
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tyrannical, dangerous and illegitimate (Renshon and Suedfeld, 2007: 4). What to 
do about them is quite another matter. President Bush has invaded Iraq, support 
six-nation talks with North Korea, and deferred to the European Union lead in 
referring Iran to the United Nations for its clandestine efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons. The reasons for the separate policies are to be found in their different 
strategic circumstances and the nature of the problem in each of the three 
countries. 
 Iran is coming of age in the international system and is now rapidly 
growing into a regional superpower in the strategically important Middle East 
(Davies, 2008: 209). The speed with which Iran’s economic and military power 
has increase has led to a more assertive foreign policy which seems destined to 
lead to fiercer resistance toward the United States. This new assertiveness 
combined with the development of a domestic nuclear program and a U.S. 
President who is willing to use force in the international arena is a potentially 
combustible mix beside that according to Roskin and Coyle (2008:331) 
Washington is also totally against Iran getting nukes, which would make it the 
regional power. Pentagon officials worry Iran could also pass on a nuclear device 
to Hezbollah’s or other extremist for another, bigger 9/11. 
 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) commonly known as 
North Korea, according to Hymans (2008:259) undermines two common 
assumptions about the DPRK nuclear threat: first, that the North Korean 
leadership’s nuclear intentions are a measured response to the external 
environment, and second, that the DPRK has developed enough technical 
capacity to go nuclear whenever it pleases. In place of these assumptions puts 
forth the general theoretical hypotheses that (1) the decision to go nuclear is 
rarely if ever based on typical cost-benefit analysis, and instead reflects deep-
stated national identity conceptions, and (2) the capacity to nuclear depends not 
only on raw levels of industrialization and nuclear technology, but also on the 
state’s organizational acumen. 
 According to Adam Quinn from University of Leicester (2008:44) most 
international relations (IR) theories concerned with power balancing would 
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suggest that such a vision for the future, universal Great-Power cooperation 
under the auspices of American hegemonic power is ideologically confused and 
impracticable. The Bush strategy seems to suggest that common interests and 
values will overcome any temptation other powers have to balance against 
America. Yet the disputatious nature of the administration’s relations with most 
other powers throughout the implementation of its policy illustrates the 
vulnerability of any plan based on such an assumption. 
 
Definition 
In order to avoid misunderstanding and confusion when reading this 
study and to clarify the purpose of this study, the researcher has provided the 
meanings of the terms used in this study: 
a. Three countries are Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Bush’s  goal (according to 
Bush)  is to prevent regimes (terrorist) that sponsor terror from 
threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass 
destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since 
September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a 
regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while 
starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports 
terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for 
freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to 
support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and 
nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that 
has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens - 
leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a 
regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the 
inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized 
world.  
b. The “axis of evil” countries  is a term coined by United StatesPresident 
George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 in 
order to describe governments that he accused of helping terrorism and 
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seeking weapons of mass destruction. President Bush named Iran, Iraq, 
and North Korea in his speech. President Bush's presidency has been 
marked by this notion as a justification for the War on Terror. 
Analysis 
 This research is based on Bush’s administration towards “axis of evil” 
countries. The Bush administration to describe “the policy that nations harboring 
terrorists would be treated as if they were guilty of terrorists acts” (Renshon and 
Suedfeld, 2007: 39).  The United States appealed to arguments which suggested 
its actions, by addressing a real threat centering on WMD and terrorism, 
furthered the common interest of all the Great Power. In practice, however, 
almost all those power lined up to criticize and obstruct American effort to 
assemble a coalition for invasion. This highlighted an age-old, perhaps inherent, 
problem at the heart of any agenda based on t he pursuit of assumedly common 
interests: the national interests, while they may be asserted, in the language of 
generalities, to be common, cannot be defined with sufficient objectivity to 
guarantee agreement on policy in concrete cases. Hence a nation may find itself 
unilaterally acting to defend, as it argues it, the interests of other powers, 
through actions which those very same powers themselves oppose. As U.S. policy 
twisted itself into this precarious ideological poise, the Iraq debate inevitably 
became concentrated not on the shared values and interests of all nations but on 
the undesirable qualities of American hegemony. 
 This following chart is used to explain the problem statement : 
  
The new world order and the new war have created a great deal about the 
meaning of US policy and national (grand) strategy.    Palmer noted:  
STRATEGY
NATIONAL 
INTEREST
POLICY
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The term “strategy,” derived from the ancient Greek, originally 
pertained to the art of generalship or high command. In modern 
times, “grand strategy” has come into use to describe the overall 
defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the mid-
twentieth century, “national strategy” has attained wide usage, 
meaning the coordinated employment of the total resources of a 
nation to achieve its national objectives (Sarkesian and Connor, JR, 
2006: 122). 
 
But other definition, the strategy insisted that: 
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can 
no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. 
The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s 
threat, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused 
by our adversary’s choice of weapons, do not permit that option. 
We cannot let our enemies strike first (Bellamy, etc, 2008:117).  
 
 Grand strategy is the usual label given to the way a state intends to 
pursue its national interest. From this a number of other strategies are designed 
that are focused on specific region or issues. Thus, there is military strategy, 
economic strategy, political strategy, psychological strategy. Policy refers to 
goals, strategy is the means to reach these goals. 
 US national interests are expressions of major US policy objectives 
projected into the international arena. 
 
We must recognize that America does indeed have national 
interests in the world, including an extremely important interest in 
the sturdy legitimacy of the international system as it change over 
time...This does not imply that American global hegemony is 
needed now or in the future- as it was needed to deal with the 
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global Soviet military threat throughout the Cold War. Instead, we 
need to be both precise and clear about our national interests as 
the twin military and geopolitical transformations remake the 
international order (Sarkesian and Connor, JR, 2006: 100). 
  
The purpose of these interests includes the creation and perpetuation of 
an international environment that is not inimical (antagonistic) to the peaceful 
pursuit of American values. It follows that such interests are those that nurture 
and expand democracy and open systems. Conversely, these interests are those 
that prevent the expansion of closed system using force or indirect aggressive 
means. But all national interests do not automatically translate into vital 
interests and therefore into a national security concern that is, a situation where 
military involvement must be contemplated and perhaps undertaken. 
 As stated, at the core of US national interest is the survival of the 
homeland and the American political order. But survival cannot be limited to the 
final defense of the homeland. In light of today’s weapons technology, ideological 
imperatives and international terrorism, among other things, the concept of 
survival of the homeland means more than retreating to the borders of the 
United States and threatening total destruction of any who attack. 
 If national interest is invoked only in those cases where the homeland is 
directly threatened and its survival is at stake, then the concept is of litte use. 
Indeed, it may be too late if Americans wait until survival is at stake.  If the 
concept of national security is to have any meaning in terms of policy and 
strategy, then it must mean something more than survival of the American 
homeland. It is interpretation and application of this broader view that spark a 
great deal of debate and disagreement between the Executive and Legislative 
branches of government and between varieties of groups in the American 
political arena, including the media. 
 A useful way to try to distinguish the various elements in the concept of 
national interests is to view these from the perspective of priorities: core (first 
order), contiguous (second order) and outer (third order). In the concept of new 
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war following 9/11 the distinction between these various interests has 
considerably blurred. Third order interests may at some point move quickly into 
first-order interests as international terrorists as well as non-state actors are 
seen as immediate challenges to US national interests. Many point to the US 
invasion of Iraq as an example of such a phenomenon. 
 
First Order: vital interests 
 Protection of the homeland, and areas and issues directly affecting 
this priority, requires a total military mobilization and resource 
commitment of the nation’s total effort. Now this also includes 
homeland security and increasingly involves private security firms 
as well as National Guard and Reserve forces. 
 
Second Order: Critical Interests 
 These are areas and interests that do not directly affect the 
country’s survival, but in the long run have a high propensity for 
becoming first-order priorities. In the immediate period, these 
have a direct influence on first order priorities. Such interests are 
measured primarily by the degree to which they maintain, nurture 
and expand open systems. Military force may be the instrument of 
choice, but not necessarily the only instrument. 
 
Third Order: Serious Interests 
 These are areas and issues that do not seriously affect first- and 
second-order interests, but do cast some shadow over such 
interests. US efforts are focused on creating favorable conditions to 
preclude such issues from developing into higher-order ones. 
Unfavorable third-order interests serve as a warning to second-
order interests. Variety o non-military instruments are probably 
the most appropriate (Sarkesian and Connor, JR, 2006: 122). 
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All other interests are peripheral in that they are placed on a watch list. 
This means there is no immediate impact on any order of interests, but these 
matters should be watched in case events raise them to a higher order. In the 
meantime, these peripheral interests require few if any US resources. 
Nonetheless, as 9/11 showed, peripheral interests can quickly become first 
order interests. This requires close and reasonably accurate intelligence 
assessments of the strategic landscape in the current period. 
 American values as they apply to the external world are at the core of 
national interests. National interests do not mean that US strategy is limited to 
the immediate homeland of the United States. These require power projection 
into various parts of the world. National interests and national security are 
closely linked. But these interests must be differentiated in terms of vital (core) 
and other interests. This should be the critical aspect of national security. The 
president is the focal point in defining and articulating American national 
interests because president is the dominant actor in American foreign policy 
(Janda, dkk, 2000: 669). To do this effectively, the President must demonstrate 
leadership and understanding of the domestic and international setting. There 
must be a degree of consensus between the American public and national leaders 
regarding when national interests demand the use of military force.
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